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Article 8

RECENT CASE NOTES
INSURANCE-CONSTUCTION-The defendant insurance company issued
a policy of life insurance to plaintiff's husband. The policy contained the
following clause: "Indemity under this policy shall not be payable for any
death or disability that may be caused or contributed to, wholly or in part,
by any of the following causes . . . while engaged in aviation or ballooning, suicide, or any other attempt thereat while sane or insane." The
insured died as a result of injuries sustained in the fall of an aeroplane in
which he was a passenger. Plaintiff alleges compliance with and performance of all conditions precedent to the right to recover as the beneficiary
named in said policy of life insurance; that the death of the insured was
not caused by any of the means contained within the exception clause of the
policy; that the defendant has refused and continues to refuse to pay
plaintiff as beneficiary under the policy. A demurrer was filed alleging
that the complaint does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of
action. This demurrer was overruled, to which overruling the appellant
at the time excepted, and, refusing to plead further, final judgment was
rendered against the appellant for the amount due on the policy, with interest and costs. From such judgment this appeal was taken. Held:
Affirmed. That riding as a passenger in an aeroplane does not constitute
an exception or excepted risk under the terms of the policy of insurance
sued upon, but the phrase "engaged in aviation" implies that the risk
excepted it for the insured to have taken part in the operation of the
aeroplane as an occupation or otherwise, and that merely riding as a
passenger therein does not come within the exception of the policy; and
that liability under an insurance policy for death from bodily injuries by
accidental or other means will not be destroyed by language of exception,
unless such exception is clear and free from reasonable doubt. Masonic
Accident Insurance Co. v. Jackson, Supreme Court of Indiana, Jan. 23, 1929,
164 N. E. 628.
"The word 'engage' means 'to take a part; to devote attention and
effort; to employ one's self; to carry on; to conduct; be busied; to occupy
one's self,' Graves v. Knights of the Maccabees of the World, 112 N. Y.
Supp. 948, 950, 128 App. Div. 660" 2 Words and Phrases,p. 273. The new
Standard Dictionary defines "aviation" as the "art of flying, especially the
management of aeroplanes." So far, therefore, as the meaning of the
phrase "engaged in aviation!" is concerned, it would seem clear that the
holding of the Supreme Court in this case is correct.
The principal case came before our Appellate Court on Mar. 31, 1925,
and will be found reported in 147 N. E. 156. The opposite conclusion was
reached in the appellate court. The court there said: "A passenger in an
airplane, not piloting the machine, is 'engaged in aviation' within the meaning of an exception in an insurance policy specifically excepting such risk."
Citing: Travelers' Ins. Co. v. Peake, 82 Fla. 128, 89 So. 418, 1928 U. S. Av.
R. 156; Bew v. Travelers' Ins. Co., 95 N. J. Law 533, 112 Atl. 859, 14
A. L. R. 983, 1928 U. S. Av. &. 151.

COMMENTS
In the case of Benefit Ass'n. Ri. Employees v. Hayden, 175 Ark. 565,
299 S. W. 995, it was held that one killed while a passenger in an airplane
was not "engaged in aeronautics" within an exception stated in a policy.
This case is therefore directly in point. By way of analogy, many cases
can be cited to support the principal case. Sovereign Camp W. 0. W., v.
Compton, 140 Ark. 313, 215 S. W. 672; Miller v. Illinois Bankers' Life
Ass'n?., 138 Ark. 442, 212 S. W. 310, 7 A. L. R. 378; Benham v. American
Cen. Life Ins. Co., 140 Ark. 612, 217 S. W. 462; Nutt v. Security Life Ins.
Co., 142 Ark. 29, 218 S. W. 675; Guiltinan v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co.,
69 Vt. 469, 38 AtL 315.
In Sovereign Camp Wooden of the World v. Compton, 140 Ark. 313,
215 S.W. 672, the insured was drafted into army, assigned to aviation section and killed while flying. By-law prohibited from membership those
"engaged in aviation," unless additional premium paid. Insured kept up
dues, but paid no additional prdmium. It was held that the by-law applied
only to those engaged in aviation as a private enterprise and not to persons
in service of army or navy. Membership was not forfeited by joining
aviation branch or failure to pay additional assessments. In accord (by
analogy). Guiltinan v. MetropolitanLife Ins. Co., 69 Vt. 469, 38 At. 315.
In Tierney v. Occidental Life Ins. Co., 265 P. 400 (Cal.), the insured,
after arriving at the landing field, was leaving the plane, and had alighted
upon the ground, stooped to avoid a wire and was struck in the head by
the propeller, and it was held that the insured did not suffer injury either
"while participating or in consequence of having participated in aeronautics" within the terms of an insurance policy. The California court quoted
with approval the maxim that "in construing the terms of an insurance
policy, if there be any ambiguity, it must be construed most strongly
against the insurers, since the language is their own." Faris v. American
National Assurance Co., 44 Cal. App. 55, 185 P. 1035; Williamsburg v.
Willard (C. C. A.) 164 F. 404, 21 L. R. A. (n. s.) 103. The Supreme Court
substantially adopted this maxim in the following language: "
liability for such death will not be destroyed by language of exception, unless such exception shall be clear and free from reasonable doubt. If a
policy be ambiguous, the doubt will be dissolved against the insurer." Maxwell v. Springfield F. & M. Ins. Co., 73 Ind. App. 251, 125 N. E. 645; Hessler v. Federal Casualty Co., 190 Ind. 68, 129 N. E. 325, 14 A. L. R. 1329.
The writer is of the opinion that the conclusion reached by the Supreme
Court is in accord with the weight of authority on the question inT. R. D.
volved.
MUNICIPAL CORPoRATIoNs-GOVERNMENT LIABTrrY IN TORT-In an acaction against a city, the appellant alleged injuries resulting from tripping
over a metal safety zone marker in the street. Further allegations were
made that the city "negligently caused the markers to be put in the
street"; that the markers "were of such character as to endanger the life
and safety of persons using the street for the purpose of alighting from
street cars," and that appellee well knew of all these facts. To these
allegations appellee demurred. On appeal, held: demurrer overruled and
city made liable. Hudson v. City of Terre Haute. Appellate Court of
Indiana, January 11, 1929. 164 N. E. 502.
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The appellee city sought to escape liability on the theory that in establishing safety zones it was exercising a governmental function and so was
immune from liability for damages resulting from the exercise of such a
function. This distinction between governmental and municipal or ministerial functions is based upon the historical doctrine that the King can do
no wrong. Having come into the modern law as a matter of precedent,
much confusion is resulting from the attempts to apply the doctrine or
the distinction in exempting municipal corporations from liability. Consequently numerous exceptions have arisen as where a city is held liable for
public nuisances, for breach of duty to employees, or for negligence in the
management of property even though the acts were all done in the discharge of governmental functions. Anable v. Board, 34 Ind. App. 72;
City of Lafayette v. Allen, 81 Ind. 166. In the case of negligent street
maintenance, Indiana follows the rule imposing liability on the city. City
of Indicnapolis v. Moss, 74 Ind. App. 129. Also see City of Kokomo v.
Loy, 185 Ind. 18. Because of the arbitrary application or exception of the
non-liability doctrine, there has been a tendency in recent years to repudiate the doctrine entirely. 14 Cal. L. R. 229. An outstanding case is
Fowler v. City of Cleveland, (Ohio) 126 N. E. 72, now overruled in that
state. See 29 Yale L. J. 911; 23 Mich. L. R. 325; Irvine v. Greenwood,
(S. C.) 72 S. E. 228. Whether or not the distinction in the doctrine is
still practical is dubious. It seems there is no present day reason why a
municipal corporation should not have the same liability, especially in tort
cases, as a private individual, regardless of the functions performed. 26
Mich. L. J. 222; 34 Yale L. J. 129, 135, 229.
In holding the city liable in the present case a departure from the
strict non-liability rule is evident, since the maintenance of safety zones
along with other safety measures might be classed as a governmental
function. Yet the decision does not repudiate the doctrine, the court reasoning, "we refrain from expressing any opinion to what the holding would
have been in absence of admission by appellee by its demurrer of the danjerous character of the markers." A number of decisions exempting
municipal corporations from liability are cited. (Seibert v. Missouri R. Co.,
87 S. W. 995; City of Jacksonville v. Bell, 112 So. 885), distinguishing them
by the fact that in none was there an admission of negligence on the part
of the municipality. However, if the court did wish to adhere to the historical doctrine, the fact of negligence in any degree would not operate to
impose liability, 43 C. J. 924. Decisions such as the present, which in
result is surely a desirable holding, in comparison with other conflicting
authority, show some ground for advocation of the abolition of the historical distinction. Although the distinction is well established in the old law,
the tendency of courts today to make inconsistent exception or to evade the
rule entirely seems to show it is no longer desirable. Remedy by statute or
constitutional amendment is recommended. 75 Pa. L. R. 555; 34 Yale L. J.
135; 14 Cal. L. R. 229.
C. W. D.
OPTION-OFFER AND ACCEPTANCE--ASSIGNABiLrrY OF
PTION.-The
plaintiff brings this action to recover possession of certain land. The
plaintiff leased the premises to E. Moon for five years. The lease contained an option whereby E. Moon might purchase the farm for $5,000,
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$1,000 payable at time of execution of deed and $4,000 in annual installments of $500; the plaintiff agreeing that any improvements made on the
property should be applied on the first payment of the purchase. E. Moon
did not accept the option but made some improvements on the land. E.
Moon, in writing, assigned the lease to the defendant. The defendant went
to the plaintiff and demanded a deed; he did not offer her $1,000 in cash but
said that more than $1,000 worth of improvements had been made, and
offered to check the improvements with her and if they did not amount to
$1,000 he promised to pay the difference in cash. The defendant also
tendered eight $500 notes secured by a mortgage on the farm to guarantee
the installments. The plaintiff refused to sell the farm. held: The plaintiff is entitled to recover possession of the land. Kritz v. Moon, Appellate
Court of Indiana, October 3, 1928, 163 N. E. 112.
Even granting assignability of the option, it seems that the result
reached by the court is a correct one. That acceptance of an option is
necessary before an action for damages for breach of contract may be
brought is so well settled as not to require comment. There is no contract
to breach until the option has been accepted. Williston on Contracts,
Sec. 64. That acceptance must be in accordance with the terms of the
offer is a settled rule about which there can be no question. Williston on
Contracts, Sec. 73. While granting the assignability of the option, for the
purpose of discussion, the court does not say it was assignable-in fact the
opinion questions its assignability because of the personal-confidence element. This was an option to purchase land contained in a lease of the
land. Therefore assignability might, in this case, be supported on the doctrine of covenants running with the land. The liabilities and benefits of the
covenant would run to the assignee of the lease. Blackeman v. Miller, 136
Cal. 138; Page v. Hughes, 41 Ky. 439; Hagar v. Buck, 44 Vt. 285. However, had this option not been in a lease, could it nevertheless have been
assigned? The option holder has a power of acceptance. Willis, Introduction to Anglo-American Law, 37. A power alone cannot be assigned.
Boston Ice Co. v. Potter, 123 Mass. 28. The option holder also has a right
that the offer to him be kept open. Willis, Introduction to Anglo-American
Law, 18. A right, such as a right to purchase land, may be assigned.
Moore v. Gawrighitti, 228 Ill. 143. And so when the right and the power
are combined in an option, and performance is such that it can be rendered
by anyone as well as by the original option holder, it seems that the rule
generally applied to powers should yield to the rule applicable to rights and
thus made the option assignable. This appears to be the weight of authority. Wilkins v. Hardaway, 159 Ala. 565; Chesbrough v. Vizard Inv.
Co., 156 Ky. 149. For the minority view, see: Wheeling Greek Co. v. Elder,
J. A. B.
170 Fed. 215; Newtton v. Newton, 11 R. I. 390.
TORT-LAST CLEAR CHANcF--IiTE-NEGNiGNNcF-Action by administratrix to recover for wrongful death of decedent alleged to have been
caused by negligence of defendant in running an interurban car upon an
auto in which decedent was riding. Car stalled on crossing maintained by
defendant for the use of decedent's father and mother, and also for those
going to the respective farms. Crossing recently repaired and cars often
stalled on it because of its natural situation inherent nature. Decedent was
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going to father's farm when his auto stalled on the track; the motorman
saw car when 250 ft. away. Evidence showed that a car going at the same
rate of speed as the interurban could have stepped in 200 ft. Instruction
given which in substance authorized a recovery if defendant saw the car
stalled, realized the danger, and could have avoided it, even though decedent
was guilty of contributory negligence. Defendant contended instruction
was erroneous for the reason that decedent was a mere licensee. Held:
Affirmed. Even though decedent was guilty of contributory negligence,
that was no defense when defendant had the last clear chance to avoid the
accident. Terre Haute, Indianapolis & Eastern Traction Co. v. Ferrell,
Appellate Court of Indiana, Dec. 21, 1928, 164 N. E. 307.
It is well settled that where there is contributory negligence, it is no
defense, if the other party had the "last clear chance," to avoid the injury.
Grank Trunk v. Ives, 144 U. S. 408, Churn v. Washington City, 207 U. S.
302, Evans v. Adams Express Co., 122 Ind. 362, Turnbull v. New Orleans
Ry., 120 Ind. 783. The weight of authority, followed in Indiana, also requires actual knowledge of the peril, Union Traction Co. v. Vatchet, 191
Ind. 324, Southern Ry Co. v. Wahl, 196 Ind. 581, and the fact that the injured party's peril might have been discovered had the defendant looked will
not authorize a recovery on the "last clear chance," doctrine. Engle v.
C. C. C. & St. L. Ry., 197 nd. 263. Terre Haute Traction Co. v.. Stevenson,
189 Ind. 100.
The fact that decedent was only a licensee, had it been proved, would be
no defense, for had decedent been a trespasser, and defendant known of
the danger the "last clear chance" doctrine would apply. Southern Ry. Co.
v. Wahl, 196 Ind. 581. Where it appears that a railroad has built approaches to its tracks, coupled with the fact that a farmer owned land on
the other side and had been using the crossing, there is an invitation to use
the crossing and the users cannot be treated as mere licensees or trespassers. B. & 0. v. Slaughter, 167 Ind. 330, L. E. & W.. R. R. v. Heming, 183
A. L. B.
Ind. 511.
WILLS-CONSTRUCTION OF-DEVISE TO WIFE-LFE ESTATE WITH POwER
OF DISPOSITION IN FaEn-One Isaac Fry died leaving a will which devised
to his wife, Mary L. Fry, all his property both real and personal "for
and during her natural lifetime" with full power "to use, enjoy, and dispose of same (in fee simple) for her own use and benefit" as she deemed
best. Testator then devised to his niece and nephews whatever of his
property remained undisposed of by his wife during her lifetime. After
testator's death his will was duly probated, and thereafter his widow
signed and duly executed a deed purporting to convey to testator's niece,
Mary Booker, the real estate here in controversy. The deed recited a consideration of one dollar and other considerations, but evidence in the record
tended to show that Mary L. Fry attempted to convey the land for services
rendered by the said Mary Booker to Isaac Fry during the latter's lifetime.
Soon after the execution of this deed, Mary Fry died. Mary Booker then
brought action against the nephews to quiet title to the real estate, and to
recover possession with damages for unlawful detention. Judgment for
defendants was given and Plaintiff's motion for a new trial overruled.
Plaintiff appeals, assigning as error the overruling of her motion for a
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new trial. Held: Judgment affirmed. Booker v. Deane, et al., App. Ct.
Ind., Oct. 24, 1928, 163 N. E. 287.
Under the rule that where an estate is given generally, or indefinitely,
with a power of disposition, it passes a fee simple, any limitation over being
void, a grant of a life estate only with a power of disposing of the fee, does
not give a fee simple to such tenant. Beatson, et al. v. Bowers, et al., 174
Ind. 601; Wiley, et al. v. Gregory, et al., 135 Ind. 647; Mulvane v. Rude,
Executors, et al., 146 Ind. 476; Dunning v. Van Dusen, 47 Ind. 423. However, the gift of the power to dispose of the whole estate annexed to such
life estate with remainder over in fee to a third person, is not void for
repugnancy, and confers upon the life tenant plenary power to convey the
fee upon the terms of the power granted. Rinkenberger v. Meyer, 155 Ind.
152; Clark v. Middlesworth, 82 Ind. 246; Bowser v. Mattler, 137 Ind. 649,
652; Mulvane v. Rude, supra&. Nor is the limitation over a third party
void for repugnancy, and whatever portion remains undisposed of by the
first taker at his death, goes to such third party. Bowser v. Mattler, supra;
Wiley, et al. v. Gregory, et al, supra. Under the will the widow had the
power to convey the real estate only for her own use and benefit. The
evidence was such here as to show that the execution of said deed was an
attempt to convey contrary to the intent of the testator, and outside the
power granted by the will; hence the deed was inoperative to transfer the
K. J. M.
fee to appellant.

